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Paying for free delivery: dependent self-employment as a measure of precarity in parcel delivery 
Sian Moore, University of Greenwich and Kirsty Newsome, University of Sheffield  
 
Abstract 
This article explores the relationship between supply chain pressures in parcel delivery and how the 
drive to contain costs to ‘preserve value in motion’, including the costs of failed delivery, underpins 
contractual differentiation. It focuses on owner-drivers and home couriers paid by delivery exploring 
precarity through the lens of the labour process, while locating it within the supply chain, political 
economy and ‘instituted economic process’ that define it (Behring and Harvey, 2015). Focus on the 
labour process shows how ‘self-employment’ is used to remove so-called ‘unproductive’ time from 
the remit of paid labour. Using Smith’s (2006) concept of double indeterminacy the article captures 
the dynamic relationship between those on standard and non-standard contracts and 
interdependency of effort power and mobility power. It exposes the apparent mobility and autonomy 
of dependent self-employed drivers while suggesting that their presence, alongside the increased use 
of technology, reconfigures the work-effort bargain across contractual status.  
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Forming part of the logistics sector, parcel delivery work has expanded rapidly under the impetus of 
internet shopping and e-commerce and has become dominated by dependent self-employment.  
Government figures point to substantial increase in those considered self-employed, while a spate of 
recent Employment Tribunal (ET) cases involving Uber and City Sprint have exposed the fiction of ‘self-
employment’ and the contradiction between contractual status and the high level of dependency and 
surveillance that characterises the work of the so-called ‘self-employed’ (Employment Tribunal 2016a, 
Employment Tribunal 2016b). Despite these cases the Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices 
(BEIS, 2017) declined to recognise the employment rights of ‘self-employed’ workers, highlighting the 
increase in their numbers, while celebrating the flexibility of the UK labour market. Previously Field 
and Forsey had exposed the `Hermesisation’i of parcel delivery services and detailed the panoply of 
‘questionable working practices’ that characterise the organisation of work (Field and Forsey 2016:3).  
The reconfiguration of the supply chain has fuelled a burgeoning logistics infrastructure and a myriad 
of sub-contracting relationships and fissured workplaces (Weil, 2014). The requirement for more 
exacting, demanding and time critical levels of delivery results in an increasingly competitive market. 
The ‘last mile of delivery’ at the end of the supply chain is said to be the key to competitive advantage, 
with the costs of non-delivery crucial. The application of increasingly complex IT systems track and 
trace the movement of parcels under the watchful gaze of the employer and increasingly the 
customer. A European study exploring employment change in the parcel delivery sector highlights that 
liberalisation and de-regulation have resulted in far-reaching deterioration in employment conditions 
with increases in atypical employment, precarity and ‘self-employment’ paid by piece-rate (Herman, 
2013).   
Precarious work has become an umbrella term for a range of often undifferentiated ‘non-standard’ 
forms of employment to which contractual insecurity is central. Prosser (2016) has discussed 
precarious work in terms of competing theories of dualization and liberalisation, whose application is 
country specific. Dualization is the confinement of precarity to sections of the workforce (the 
periphery) with ‘insider’ actors complicit. Liberalisation, in contrast, threatens employment security 
and terms and conditions for all workers as a result of structural processes. Recalling the possibility of 
Fordism as exception and precarity as norm (Neilson and Rositer, 2008), this article conceptualises 
precarity through the lens of liberalisation, informed by Vosko’s (2006) warning against dichotomising 
standard and non-standard work.  It draws firstly on Behring and Harvey’s (2015) ‘instituted economic 
process’ approach to explain the proliferation of ‘self-employment’ in parcel delivery. They assert 
legal, fiscal and economic organizational processes as co-constitutive of the labour market within 
which employment status is defined (2015:971). Fudge’s (2017) discussion of the decline of the 
standard employment contract similarly points to the influence of institutional, fiscal and social 
policies, employer strategies and trade union responses. If these authors provide a wider political 
economy for dependent self-employment, Smith’s (2006) conceptualisation of the double 
indeterminancy of labour - effort power and mobility power - allows a necessary link to the labour 
process. Here ‘internal differentiation within the firm – segmenting jobs into different contracts’ - can 
be read as an attempt on the part of the employer to minimise the mobility power of internal labour 
(2006:399). The case of parcel delivery suggests that the use of ‘self-employed’ labour impacts upon 
both the mobility and work-effort bargain of directly employed drivers. At the same time the freedom 
of movement and control over the labour process that are implied by ‘self-employment’ is actually 
constrained; mobility and the organisation of work are subject to control – the double indeterminacy 
of ‘self-employed’ drivers is resolved in favour of the employer. For parcel delivery companies, self-
employment may go some way to resolve uncertainties in the capitalist employment relationship and 
within the supply chain. 
This article draws upon qualitative research exploring the impact of supply chain pressures on work 
and employment in the parcel delivery sector.  The article firstly outlines the political economy of 
logistics, the liberalisation and privatisation of postal services and the changing nature of the UK parcel 
delivery sector. Secondly it sets out the institutional framework, the growth in ‘self-employment’ and 
UK state support for it in the face of legal challenges. Research methods are detailed and the article 
then explores the evidence from in-depth interviews with directly employed and ‘self-employed’ 
parcel delivery workers in the context of three case-study organisations. It illustrates the 
differentiated contractual status of labour as pressures are passed down the supply chain and the role 
of collective regulation in differentiation. It exposes the fiction of self-employment in parcel delivery 
and the way that dependent self-employment facilitates unpaid work, adding unpaid labour to extant 
dimensions of precarity. Finally it looks at the impact of the substitutability of labour on the mobility 
power of directly employed drivers alongside effort power in terms of the wage-effort bargain. 
The political economy of Parcel Delivery in the UK 
This study of parcel delivery in the UK is set in the context of the liberalisation of the postal service 
involving a change in the regulatory regime and ultimately (in 2013) the privatisation of Royal Mail. 
The third Postal Services Directive in 2008 required all EU postal markets to be opened to competition, 
and in the UK the Postal Services Act 2011 reflected that requirement. The parcels market has 
expanded in response to ‘a revolution of e-commerce’ (Ofcom, 2014) with Britain the biggest online 
shopping market in Europe (Financial Times 23 November 2014). In 2013 products ordered online 
generated just over one billion deliveries; by 2018, this number was expected to grow by 28.8% to 
1.35 billion (Barclays, 2014). Turnover in the UK parcel market, dominated by Royal Mail, Hermes and 
Yodel, jumped 9.7% in 2016 to £9.7bn (Financial Times, 20 February 2017). Crucially intense 
competition means carriers receiving less for deliveries (Financial Times, 6 January 2016) with the 
communications regulator Ofcom finding that the average price paid to deliver a domestic parcel fell 
in 2015-16.  
The Financial Times (FT) has reported that ‘faster delivery times have become a critical issue for postal 
operators and retailers’ (23 November 2014) with the success of DPD (owned by France’s La Poste) in 
increasing its parcel volumes due, at least in part, to its delivery technology - a nationwide seven-day 
service that uses GPS technology to give customers a one -hour delivery window and lets the company 
track the driver on route. As important as delivery times is the issue of failed deliveries, with first time 
delivery vital to competitiveness and the onus on the company to deliver rather than the customer to 
be home. For the FT this issue has not been effectively resolved, with repeat deliveries representing 
real costs for companies and a spokesman for Deutsche Post reporting that it can take three delivery 
attempts before a parcel is received (Financial Times, 23 November 2014). Barclays report on the 
sector confirmed that the biggest issue facing logistics firms is delivering goods when recipients are 
not present and that over 63% of carriers stated this as a concern (Barclays, 2014).  
More critical contributions have sought analytical purchase on the dimensions of the logistics 
transformation and their impact on labour. Logistics, Hesse and Rodrigue (2006) argue, supports, 
shapes and provides coherence to global production networks with its’ scope and remit operating 
beyond the simple storage and delivery of goods. Harvey et al. (2002) extend this argument by 
highlighting new conflicts over the capture of added values generated by fragmented supply chain 
relationships.  They suggest that retailers/clients not only reconfigure relations under their exacting 
patronage, but simultaneously orchestrate competition amongst third party providers (3PL) as a 
mechanism to maximise efficiency and drive down costs. As a result, contracts between retailers and 
parcel delivery providers are short-term, contingent and transparent – creating a quasi-market - 
controlled by client organisations with costs (non-delivery and damage) defrayed to providers. There 
is growing body of research evidence that focuses on the implications for labour and collective 
regulation of this ‘contested terrain’ between retailers and logistics companies (Coe, 2015). The 
‘labourers of movement’ (Cowen, 2014) find themselves within a ‘perfect storm’ of globalisation, 
fragmentation of production, fissured workplaces, new logistics technologies, and eroded collective 
regulation (Coe, 2014: Flecker et al. 2013; Newsome, 2015). It is parcel delivery workers, at the end of 
the supply chain, who experience acute cost minimisation. To date there is little research evidence 
which explores how this cost minimisation is articulated through the contractual status of workers.   
Precarity and Parcel Delivery in the UK 
Following the 2008-9 recession, self-employment has been a main source of UK employment growth. 
Tomlinson and Corlett (2017) estimate from Labour Force Survey data that it accounted for 45 per 
cent of the growth in total employment from the second quarter of 2008 to final quarter of 2016 when 
it totalled 4.6 million or one in seven of the workforce (15%). Although the category is diverse, solo 
self-employment predominates, as relatively few self-employed workers have employees (Hatfield, 
2015). Self-employment removes employment rights and employer obligation to workers, transferring 
risk and the social costs of employment (sick pay, holiday pay and pensions) to the worker.  
Studies of the construction sector demonstrate the prevalence of false or bogus self-employment 
(Behring and Harvey, 2015). Similarly, self-employment in parcel delivery is marked by many 
characteristics of direct employment, in terms of continuity of engagement with a single employer 
and control over working time and the labour process. The fiction of self-employment was exposed in 
two legal cases in 2016. In Aslam and Farrar v Uber (Employment Tribunal 2016a), two drivers 
supported by the GMB union brought claims under the Employment Rights Act 1996 and National 
Minimum Wage Act 1998 over the failure of the company to pay the minimum wage and to provide 
paid leave. Uber claimed that the drivers were not workers and thus not entitled to protection under 
the legislation. However, the ET found that the drivers had a dependent work relationship with Uber, 
not least because the company instructed drivers how to do their work and controlled them in the 
performance of their duties (Uber lost an appeal against the decision). A similar case concerned 
CitySprint (Employment Tribunal 2016b), where it was judged that a bicycle courier should be 
classified as a worker and not an ‘independent contractor’ and had a right to paid holidays. Here it 
was deemed that the regulation by the employer of the amount of work available, performance of the 
service and of the size of the workforce were indications of direct employment. She was considered 
to have no real right to appoint a substitute (to take her place when she was not available for work). 
The issue of ‘substitution’ arose again in the case of Deliveroo, with a divergent outcome. In November 
2017 a claim for union recognition for collective bargaining for Deliveroo riders failed on the basis that 
they were judged to be ‘self-employed’ because of their apparent freedom to ‘substitute’ allowing 
other riders to take their place on a job (Central Arbitration Committee, 2017). For Managing Director, 
Dan Warne, this was ‘a victory’ for the flexibility that self-employment provides (BBC, 14 November 
2017). Rights to the National Living Wage (NLW) were tested in the referral of Hermes to HM Revenue 
and Customs. The company maintained that the self-employed status of the couriers removed its legal 
responsibility to ensure they were paid the NLW, while The Guardian (20 October 2016) reported that 
the sums paid to couriers amounted to less than the hourly NLW. The subsequent investigation 
promised to shed light on how far classifications of self-employment are misplaced and the extent to 
which employers were using self-employment to circumvent payment of the NLW. 
The research presented here is concerned to understand the changing contractual status of parcel 
delivery workers in a way which moves beyond dichotomised precarious and ‘standard’ work 
contracts (Kalleberg, 2012).  This involves an approach which embeds an understanding of precarity 
in political economy but with sufficient fluidity to explore its dimensions and dynamics at the level of 
the workplace, embracing the labour process and role of labour as agent (Strauss, 2017). Behring and 
Harvey’s notion of degenerative and instituted competition between ‘different qualities and types of 
labor’ is resonant (2015:972). Exploration of the differentiated labour process of directly employed 
and ‘self-employed’ drivers allows reflection on Smith’s (2006) concept of the double indeterminancy 
of labour. Here labour mobility is one element of labour indeterminancy. Since self-employment is 
theoretically posed as a form of mobility – freedom of the individual’s disposal of their labour 
(Thompson and Smith, 2009) - the labour power of self-employed workers is potentially expanded. At 
the same time, Smith’s (2006) argument suggests that the use of self-employed workers increases the 
substitutability of directly employed labour in order to manage their mobility. This points to a dynamic 
relationship between self-employed and directly employed workers, but also ‘between the 
indeterminacies around mobility power and effort power’ (2006:399). A double-edged double 
indeterminancy arises, since for both groups of workers the second element of indeterminancy - effort 
power - is contested and constrained by the ‘employer’, in part through the fiction of the mobility 
power of ‘self-employed’ workers and in part through the technological control of performance – with 
the latter belying the status of ‘self-employed’ workers. 
Drawing on this contextual and conceptual framework the research responds to Vosko’s emphasis on 
a multi-faceted approach to elaborate how dimensions of precarious work at a macro level play out 
in practice (2006:16).  The concern is to explore how supply chain and cost pressures in parcel delivery 
have produced differential contractual statuses and to explore the construction of precarity through 
the lens of the labour process.    
Research Methods 
The article is based upon the findings of a research project concerned with exploring the working 
conditions of parcel delivery workers at the end of the supply chain. Qualitative research methods 
were adopted, focussing upon three case studies. Seven initial ‘scoping’ interviews were undertaken 
with national and international trade union officers; three from Unite, two from the Communication 
Workers Union, and two from Uni-Global and the International Transport Workers Federation. 
Following these initial interviews case studies of three national companies were undertaken, selected 
to reflect varying organisational typologies with different models of contractual status to allow 
comparative analysis (Table 1). Company A is a former state-owned enterprise and is unionised with 
terms and conditions of employment regulated by collective agreements.  Within this case-study 12 
interviews were conducted with depot managers, supervisors, trade union representatives, directly 
employed delivery workers and owner-drivers.  The second case-study, Company B, is part of a US 
multinational and is also unionised, with terms and conditions collectively negotiated.  Access to this 
company was more problematic, but eight interviews were secured with full-time union officials as 
well as directly employed workers and owner-drivers.  Finally, interviews were undertaken with six 
home-based couriers in Company C, a national organisation that is non-unionised and operates with 
both owner-drivers and home couriers.  Interviewees from all case-studies were able to reflect on the 
introduction of, rationale for and impact of owner-drivers and couriers in the organisations and in 
Company A and B on the role of collective regulation, capturing changes in the delivery labour process, 
and the terms and conditions of both ‘self-employed’ and directly employed drivers. With the 
exception of one female home courier all interviewees were white males. Triangulation was provided 
by documentary and web analysis of company policies and trade union agreements. The research was 
subject to ethical approval and all interviews were face-to-face, recorded and transcribed and based 
on informed consent with confidentiality and anonymity guaranteed.   
Owner-drivers and home couriers are necessarily difficult to locate since they have few formal 
organisational ties. Their working hours and time pressures mean that achieving in-depth interviews 
is problematic. In addition to the case-studies five in-depth interviews were conducted with owner-
drivers who had worked for seven key parcel delivery players in London, four of whom were black 
males. Here, a snowballing technique was deployed since, while they worked for different 
organisations these drivers had moved between them and retained networks. These interviews took 
the form of work histories, focussing on the motivation for self-employment, the delivery labour 
process, technology, work intensity, terms and conditions, pay and hours. Direct drivers also had 
experiences of working ‘self-employed’ for a range of providers and where interviewees talk about 
specific (non-case study) companies in their testimonies they are referred to as company1, company2 
etc – overall five companies in addition to the three case study organisations are covered. In addition 
to these in-depth interviews 10, ten-minute interviews with home couriers while on delivery were 
secured. They were approached when they were waiting on door steps and asked a limited number 
of questions, generally confined to volumes of deliveries, hours and pay. The respondents were all 
male and half were migrant workers.  A more in-depth interview was conducted with a young female 
courier from another of the key national players. The home courier interviews are supplemented with 
data from posts on two public on-line forums where there have been threads discussing ‘self-
employment’ at two delivery companies. In ethical terms the inclusion of this data reflects the tenets 
of British Sociological Association (BSA) Guidelines on Digital Research (2017) that it is generally 
accepted that there are exemptions to informed consent where research takes place in public space 
or makes use of publicly available information; posts were already anonymised and those posting 
could not be identified.  
Table 1 here 
Online posts, transcriptions and documentation were subjected to micro-level critical textual analysis 
to identify worker experience and perception, with macro-analysis illuminating how the political 
economy of parcel delivery promoted the wider social-political practices that shaped and 
contextualised the texts (Roper et al., 2010). The analysis drew on aspects of the staged panel 
approach advocated by Biographical Narrative Interpretive Methods in that interpretations were 
articulated and discussed collectively to uncover researcher subjectivity and intellectual positionality 
(Moore and Ross, 2016). 
 
Contractual differentiation  
The evidence pointed to the emergence of three tiers of contractual status driven by competitive and 
cost cutting pressures and producing different levels of precarity. The first tier covers directly 
employed drivers in large parcel delivery companies covered by extant collective agreements, which 
may have been renegotiated in the context of the pressures brought by service level agreements, but 
which provided some guarantees for a long-standing organised workforce. The second tier involved 
the introduction of a tier of technically ‘self-employed’ owner-drivers who lease or own their vans and 
were generally paid by delivery. They could work through small contractors, but were based in depots 
and worked alongside directly employed drivers. A third model was of home-based couriers (referred 
to by direct drivers as ‘life-style’ couriers – since work was seen to be organised around other 
commitments), also technically self-employed, but using their own cars with very limited 
organisational ties and no fixed workplaces.   
The research evidence suggested three corresponding typologies of parcel delivery company, 
characterised by the particular mix of directly employed, owner-driver and home-based couriers. 
Importantly, these typologies reflected the collective regulation of work. In Company A a ‘mixed 
resourcing agreement’ specified the proportions of owner-drivers that could be utilised on a depot-
by-depot basis.  Company B, similarly had established ratios of directly employed delivery workers to 
owner-drivers as part of their collective agreements.  While directly employed workers predominated 
in Company A, low cost entrants to the market such as Company C were dependent upon 
neighbourhood delivery with no union recognition. Union members in both Company A and B 
recognised that policing collective agreements in terms of monitoring ratios of self-employed drivers 
to directly employed staff was part of defending the frontier of control.  
For Vosko (2006) the removal of employment protection is a key indicator of precarity. As Fudge puts 
it contractualisation facilitated the commodification of labour (2017:376) and the move away from 
the standard employment relationship involves employers jettisoning the social costs of labour with 
risk transferred to the individual worker.  In the UK self-employment precludes employment rights, 
with no safeguards on hours and breaks and the cost of holidays and sickness borne by the worker 
themselves. In Company A owner-drivers were contracted to provide a service 52 weeks and 365 days 
of the year. As in other companies if an owner-driver took holiday or was sick it was their responsibility 
to find a substitute to cover their work and, if they could not do so they incurred the costs of the 
Company funding an agency worker and possibly a fine. The difficulties of finding cover meant one 
Company A owner-driver had not taken holiday for three years, while a respondent who was directly 
employed by Company B recalled his experiences of being an owner-driver with City Link (which 
subsequently went into administration) and the difference direct employment made: 
‘It’s really nice coming back especially after Christmas and Easter and holidays. You go away 
for two weeks and you go “Look, I’ve actually got money in the bank.” It was really hard before, 
you had to employ someone for two weeks and then if they couldn’t do it the company’d go 
“Sorry mate, I’ve had to put a courier on top of your round with your bloke,” and then you’d 
get billed for it. So you might actually come back from holiday and work another month for 
no money because you’d got to pay for the courier, which is why I think people tend not to 
have holidays when they’re self-employed. When I was an owner-driver at City Link if you 
phoned in sick they might have to put three couriers on your route and you’d come back and 
you’d get a bill for like £900 and it’d wipe your money out for a week. So you didn’t go sick’. 
[Direct Driver, Company B] 
An owner-driver for company2 reported being deducted £150 per day when sick to fund cover. Home 
couriers in Company C similarly stated that they were required to find cover for their routes if they 
wanted to go on holiday or they were sick and failure to do so resulted in fines and/or the removal of 
delivery routes.  Respondents recalled instances where the company had reduced the volume of 
parcels from couriers if they failed to deliver required rounds irrespective of circumstances, including 
serious illness and bereavement.   
Indeterminancy, the myth of mobility power and autonomy 
Vosko (2006) asserts that definitions of precarity cannot be rigidly applied across all forms of non-
standard work. While precarity implies insecurity, evidence suggests that owner-drivers had, in 
Smith’s (2006) terms, mobility power and its requisite resource requirements in terms of networks 
and labour market demand. They shared labour market intelligence and appeared to move easily 
between delivery companies – all of those interviewed had worked for a number of different 
companies and were highly aware of the terms and conditions in the sector. A depot manager 
commented: 
‘Right now wanting to join me I’ve got maybe two from company1, there’s three or four from 
company2. Well, this is what happens. I got one guy from company2 and then he’s told all of 
his mates at company2, “Oh, it’s better and it’s more money and it’s more relaxing and you 
get out a lot earlier.” so then all of his mates follow and that just as easy could happen with 
us somewhere else. One of our guys could go to companyX and say “Oh, it’s better over here”. 
When we came here we took a load from company1, about six or seven, and there’s a load 
that have come from company2. So it happens between all competitors and they all speak to 
each other as well. So my guy that’s there on one route, he will know by name the company2 
driver out there, the company3 driver out there, the companyY driver out there. They all speak 
to each other’. [Depot Manager, Company A] 
The labour turnover of owner-drivers appeared to be relatively high and the increased demand for 
home delivery promoted mobility. Delivery offered accessible work for largely male workers, although 
owner-drivers emphasized that its intensity and hours were probably unsustainable for older workers 
and workers with families. Van or lorry driving has been associated with freedom and a degree of 
autonomy over the labour process (Levy, 2015) which may be enhanced by self-employment, as a 
company4 driver commented: 
‘That’s why I love my work, this job, because you’re on the road and you do it at your own 
pace, you see? And it’s only when they need something from you, they either phone you or 
message you. That’s it’. [Owner-Driver, company4] 
One aspect of the debate over ‘self-employment’ reflected in the Taylor Review (BEIS, 2017) is worker 
preference and drivers expressed the view that driving can offer relatively high earnings for workers 
with limited accredited skills. One company2 owner-driver who had also worked as a shift manager 
for company5 suggested the contradictions while pointing to variation between owner-drivers and 
home couriers: 
‘The people who were home couriers for both company5 and company6 were undertrained, 
underpaid, under motivated, you can’t put too much expectation on them. Whereas I did 
£40,000 in my first year as a driver with company2. - well to my mind for a bloke with no skills 
and very little in the way of, I mean I’m not stupid, but I’ve got no qualifications, I can’t go into 
a profession, but to earn 40 plus grand a year unskilled, that’s a good wage. And I think that is 
borne out in the way the company operates. It’s got the means to pay a bloke like me 40 grand 
a year because it will get every pound of flesh out of me it can, but it will be worth it for me - 
I mean it’s not perfect, but…’ [Owner-driver, company2] 
While self-employment appears to enshrine mobility power and autonomy over the labour process 
once in the van, the comment of a depot manager for Company A implied the precarious nature of 
the definition of owner-drivers as self-employed: 
‘You’ve got to ensure that you’re not giving the impression they are employees because 
they’re not. So you’ve got to treat them as contractors. They are a resource. They work for 
themselves, they don’t work for us. They’re contractors. We give them the parcels and they 
work for themselves. They’re businessmen, aren’t they?’ [Manager2, Company A] 
However, the increasing stipulations as to how and when owner drivers and home couriers 
completed their daily tasks were of growing concern to respondents. Management control over the 
allocation of work and thus driver’s capacity to earn operated as disciplinary mechanism with the 
threat of removing parcels used to secure compliance, as for one home courier:  
‘They threaten you, you either do it or you’re out. It’s that kind of environment. You live in 
threat of them saying, no parcels, that’s it. It’s awful to think, that after doing ten years for 
them, doing all the hard work, building a round up for them, they go “see you later”. You’ve 
got nothing, and that’s what they threaten you with. All the time, “we’ll just take your 
parcels”.  Everything you do wrong now, they say, “oh well you know we can suspend your 
parcels”.  [Home courier1, Company C]  
At the same there is close monitoring and surveillance of work through the hand-held Personal Digital 
Assistants (PDAs) that electronically track and trace the movement of goods, but also the movement 
of both directly employed and self-employed labour. Home couriers in Company C were required to 
send customers ‘estimated time of arrival’ (ETA) texts, accommodating requested delivery slots during 
mornings, lunch-times and afternoons. The company was unrelenting in its expectations that delivery 
slots be adhered to and failure to do so risked drivers being placed on ‘improvement notices’, as 
another home courier reported:   
‘The rules have changed, you have to adhere to what they want. You have to set ETA to how 
you feel that you can deliver your round, but you have to incorporate their a.m., their midday, 
and their p.m.’s. I recently had an email stating, “Yes, you are self-employed, but you have to 
adhere to what we ask you to do”. There is the tracking, the proper receipt scanning outside 
of doors, as many signatures as possible. You’re not self-employed - now it’s, “You must, you 
must, you must, you must …” ‘. [Home courier2, Company C].  
In the ET case taken by a City Sprint courier (referred to above) the fact that the claimant was tracked 
by GPS technology and wore a company uniform contributed to the judgement that the assertion of 
couriers as self-employed was ‘window dressing’ Employment Tribunal 2016b. In parcel delivery it was 
similarly clear that, although drivers were technically self-employed, managers dictated how drivers 
did their work and controlled performance. Owner-drivers reported that depot managers applied 
pressure to ensure that deliveries were made on time with drivers not delivering their allocated load 
subject to fines.   Despite having apparent mobility and with labour effort secured through 
incentivisation by delivery rates, the organisation and pace of work was closely managed. For both 
self-employed and directly employed drivers technology increasingly drove work effort. 
Payment by delivery – unpaid labour 
While directly employed drivers had fixed hours and hourly rates, owner drivers were paid by the 
number of deliveries or drops. The key advantage of owner-drivers for the companies was the removal 
of the costs of non-delivery, effectively excising apparently non-productive or ‘dead’ time. In Company 
A directly employed drivers had a target of 70-80 drops within a fixed working day, but owner-drivers 
were initially paid by delivery for 100 drops per day, targets that increased in the following year to 120 
drops and in the year after to 130 drops. For a depot manager owner-drivers provided the flexibility 
to meet demand and offset risk: 
‘Owner-drivers need to do more work to make it pay. That’s why they’re more efficient, 
because they need to do one and a half times more than a [Company A] driver to make it pay’. 
[Delivery Manager, Company A] 
Owner-drivers in Company A were reported to receive £1.65 per parcel delivery stop and £2 for 
collections or pick-ups. An owner-driver for company2 in London had earned £1.79 per delivery on a 
residential route with about 130 stops per day. He was then moved on to a business delivery route at 
a higher rate of £2.10, with fewer stops (72 on the day of the interview). Directly employed drivers 
were reported to be on between £8 and £8.50 per hour. While in some companies owner-drivers were 
given more condensed delivery areas as driving longer distances without pay would not be financially 
viable, in others it was reported that they were allocated rural routes ‘to take the hit’ of non-
productive driving time or ‘dead mileage’. Although pay for owner-drivers was perceived as relatively 
high there were signs of deterioration in delivery rates. Drivers reported that they would be 
contracted on one delivery rate, but after some time companies would attempt to reduce the rate or 
increase targets, as one union rep who had worked as an owner-driver for company2 reported: 
‘With company2 they give them a contract and then when it comes to near the end of the 18 
months or the two year contract or 12 month contract, whichever one they’ve got, they’ll 
decrease the rate and increase their targets and they’ll say “Well, I can’t make money on that.” 
“It’s not our problem,” they say. The rate was really good when I started as an owner-driver 
and then they just chiselled and chiselled and chiselled away and then in the end they were 
going “Well you were earning £1400 a week.” “Yeah, but I’m doing the hours.” “But we don’t 
want you to earn more than £1100,” but when you take out the lorry cost, the diesel cost, the 
insurance, your uniform and everything else you’re probably working for about £4 an hour’. 
[Union Rep, Company B] 
While rates may look relatively high a range of costs have to be deducted. Owner-drivers owned or 
rented their own vans, although in Company B they could lease them and the company deducted lease 
costs (around £450 per month) and diesel costs from pay. Owner-drivers were responsible for tax, 
national insurance, business liability and goods in transit insurance, as well as for uniforms and the 
costs involved in wear and tear and damage to their vans (and renting another van when off the road).  
Rates per drop for home couriers in Company C varied from 85p per standard parcel to £1. They 
reported that wage levels were unpredictable and that low volumes of parcels would not generate 
sufficient income for drivers to reach NLW levels:  
“You’re talking insecure work when you don’t how many parcels are coming. I could get up 
tomorrow and I could have a hundred, that’s a good day’s work, I’ll be above minimum wage. 
I could also get up, and have ten. So, every day, you’re worrying, basically. Or you’re conscious 
of how much am I going to make? I know for a fact today, by doing the miles that I have to do, 
the times and everything, I’ll be lucky if I even touch £5 an hour.”  [Home courier3, Company 
C]  
Further, payment by actual delivery excludes time spent organising work, travelling between drops 
and failed deliveries, blurring the boundaries between paid and unpaid time (Supiot, 2001). For home 
couriers the demarcation between work and home was also unclear since parcels were dropped to 
their homes and between 1-2 hours daily were spent sorting parcels into delivery rounds, scanning 
them into the system and downloading the ‘manifest’ which dictated the delivery route. If all the 
parcels were accounted for (which was often not the case necessitating further phone calls) parcels 
could then be loaded on vehicles. Couriers then sent texts to customers informing them of their ETA, 
although the capacity for customers to demand delivery slots meant that drivers had to recalibrate 
their accustomed and often cost-effect delivery routes. These essential activities were all unpaid.  In 
the case of company5 home couriers posting on a forum reported that they received as little as 50p 
per delivery or collection, and could deliver up to 30-60 parcels per day covering a three mile radius 
taking between two and four hours.  As one posted:  
‘So we can assume based on 2 hour delivery time 30 x 50p = £15. Not too bad for 2 hours work 
eh? Let’s think about that - 15 parcels in 60 minutes or 1 parcel every 4 minutes. While taking 
into account driving from address to address, waiting at door, people not being home, finding 
a neighbour that is, or finding secure location to leave it. Not to mention re-delivery of items, 
of which you have to make three attempts in order to receive your 50p. This is not taking into 
account fuel expense and vehicle wear and tear, business insurance of which you have to pay 
yourself. I think it’s safe to say that with the time it takes to plan your route and deliver 30 
parcels having to re-attempt delivery etc., you’re looking at around 3-4 hours, based on one 
parcel every 6-8 minutes. That’s just £3.75 to £5.00 per hour! Take off you fuel, say £5 (and 
that’s being generous) and you’re looking at £2.50 to £3.33 per hour’. [Home Courier, 
company5 on-line] 
Another incisive post stated, ‘I suppose someone has to pay for “free delivery” – just rather it wasn’t 
me’. Owner-drivers in Company A also reported levels of unpaid labour within the working day. Here 
the distinction between paid and unpaid working time is exposed acutely when drivers return to the 
depot at the end of the day for unloading.  A directly employed driver hinted at possible tension 
between directly employed and owner-drivers: 
‘I was telling you about the queuing in the evenings. Well, they’re not paid on an hourly basis. 
So if I’m sat outside there for an hour every night queuing up, then I’m clocking it on as 
overtime. They’re not paid overtime. They’re paid on a per drop basis, so there is an issue with 
them whereby they’re petitioning that there should be two doors open in the evening – one 
where owner-drivers can just drive in and drop off their parcels and the other one where 
employed drivers would queue – which I can understand, to be honest with you, because if 
they’re not getting paid for that time and they’ve got to sit out there for an hour and a half 
then I can see, but I don’t think you’d find too many Company A drivers taking too kindly to 
sitting in a queue while other people effectively queue jump.’ [Directdriver1, Company A] 
Owner-drivers reported being in the van 12-13 hours daily. One working for company2 recounted that 
he would arrive at the depot to load his van at 5am, finish his deliveries by 2.30pm, but then had to 
wait in the van to make a scheduled collection at 4pm, returning to the depot to unload collections 
and failed deliveries and finally leaving at 5pm. This ‘waiting time’ means the worker is effectively 
available to the employer, but not paid. He also described how payment by delivery encourages the 
intensification of work. Since scanners were set for a default of four minutes per stop, arrival within 
four minutes meant drivers have ‘dead time’ before the next stop. To strip out this time drivers set 
their scanners to a lower stop time in order to finish quicker and maximise money: 
‘So what happens is you put yourself on really low minutes which may be one minute a stop 
so you’re driving quickly just getting there, but it’s making your day shorter. So there is actually 
pressure to be quick because you don’t want to be out till 8 o’clock. You want to finish, have 
a life, go home, but you also want to take out a lot of parcels to earn money’. [Owner-driver, 
company2] 
 
The substitutability of labour 
The use of owner-drivers served to mimimize the mobility power of existing workers. A directly 
employed driver expressed insecurity at their introduction: 
‘In my instance I didn’t realise that my job could go to an owner-driver, to a self-employed. I 
just thought that every route driver’s job was safe. I don’t know how many owner-drivers are 
allowed in this depot, so you never know. They could be looking for two or three now to do it 
which they’d have to obviously move somebody off their route or split it up. I don’t know that 
side of it but, like I say, when I first heard about it I thought “Well, surely they’re not allowed 
to do that?” I just thought after the years I’ve worked here my job’s not even safe’? [Direct 
Driver2, Company A] 
A driver who had worked for City Link reported that the company had threatened drivers that they 
would lose their routes if they did not move to self-employment and eventually offered an incentive 
in the form of a small contribution to the purchase of vans. In Company A a small number of directly 
employed drivers had moved into self-employment (including some dismissed by the company). 
Another owner-driver alluded to the potential displacement of directly employed drivers, reporting 
that deliveries and routes may be passed between owner-drivers and the directly employed and he 
noted the importance of securing and holding onto routes that guaranteed income: 
‘[The] next thing they’re saying to me, because they’ve got loads of employed drivers that 
they wanted to get rid of but they couldn’t get rid of them because they’ve got a lot of rights, 
they were like we need to give these guys work, so they said to me “You’ve got to give 20 of 
your stops to the employed.” 20 stops is my work, my money that I’m making and basically 
you’re taking money from me and giving it to the employed who are getting paid anyway. So 
I was thinking that’s a bit funny and I was going to kick off a stink about that when I thought, 
do you know what, I don’t want them mucking about with my route. Let me just co-operate.’ 
[Owner-Driver company2] 
The presence of owner-drivers also impacted the work-effort bargain within the organisation and the 
capacity of directly employed workers to struggle over it informally and formally. A union officer 
commented on the role of the trade union in acting as a break on work intensification for the directly 
employed, but this was in the shadow of ‘rate busting’ by owner-drivers: 
‘Whereas within the collective in-house we can keep a good discipline on these things – I’m 
not saying a go-slow - but there is a limit with regard to safety and quality of delivery, but this 
is what is being introduced alongside people directly employed who may be doing on average 
70-80 in comparison to 100 drops per day under this blueprint agreement in this franchised 
model which is directly undermining on two levels; one, you’re getting paid less doing more 
and also taking half as much away from the normal driving workforce. So we’ve had direct 
conflicts because of that’. [Union Officer] 
Despite collective regulation a union rep suggested the implicit threat of owner-drivers may have led 
to direct drivers coming into work earlier than necessary and potentially normalising unpaid labour: 
‘Some of them [direct drivers] on a morning for their own benefit sometimes will come in 
early, earlier than what their start time is to get ahead of themselves. They don’t get paid for 
it. They probably come in at half six, but they don’t get paid, but they’re still doing bits. Then 
it’s the same when they’re out delivering, because you’re driving you should have a break now 
and again; some won’t have a break, some won’t have a dinner. They’ll work through all their 
workload just to get done, but they’ll come back early. I can’t weigh it up myself. I don’t know 
why they do it. I’ve always been a man if you get paid from seven you start at seven; if you 
finish at five you work till five and no matter what you’ve got in between them hours.’ [Union 
Rep, CompanyA] 
The evidence suggests that the introduction of self-employment was creating insecurity amongst 
directly employed drivers and pressures on existing collective agreements. While both owner-drivers 
and directly employed reported limited interaction between the two groups in the depot, there was 
apparently no intention by the unions concerned to recruit or represent self-employed. While such 
organisational tension has been used to testify to dual labour markets (Palier and Thelan, 2010) the 
evidence suggests a more dynamic relationship. As a result of growing work pressures, home couriers 
in Company C were considering the possibility of trade union organisation. Media attention regarding 
bogus self-employment and resulting legal cases was providing motivation, as illustrated by one 
courier who argued, ‘Being self-employed means self-employed. We work to our own rules, and our 
own timing. We’re supposed to decide when we work, not them’.  
Conclusions 
This article reveals how intense supply chain pressures in a highly competitive parcel delivery market 
have produced differentiated contractual statuses and how reconfigured contractual status is integral 
to cost cutting, the speed-up of delivery and, crucially, the removal of non-delivery costs.  It locates 
dependent self-employment firmly within the political economy of logistics and a national institutional 
framework that legally and fiscally promotes self-employment, Behring and Harvey’s (2015) ‘instituted 
economic process’, while exposing the fiction of ‘self-employment’. Legal cases have potentially far-
reaching implications for the legal and fiscal basis of ‘self-employment’ in the UK and have 
demonstrated the potential for the collective organisation of those on non-standard contracts, 
sometimes in the face of the intransigence of existing unions. The Taylor Review (2017), however, 
suggested that government will deliver little in terms of rights for such workers and the outcome of 
the Deliveroo recognition case does not bode well. 
The articulation of political economy and labour process allows for exploration of the different facets 
of ‘self-employment’ including, in terms of employment rights, the transfer of responsibility for social 
costs such as sickness, holiday and pensions to the individual worker. Examination of the labour 
process uncovers parcel delivery companies de facto control over the work of owner-drivers. The 
testimonies of self-employed drivers are resonant with Harvey et al.’s (2016) suggestion that such 
contractual relationships may give rise to the over-estimation of, not only autonomy, but income. A 
labour process focus exposes how dependent self-employment allows for the excision of periods of 
working time from the remit of pay, in particular through the removal of the costs of non-delivery. 
Research on zero-hours contracts in homecare (Moore and Hayes, 2017) have similarly shown how 
non-standard contracts can strip so-called ‘unproductive’ labour from paid work and, as in parcel 
delivery, can allow employers to accommodate the NLW. This article makes a case for the inclusion of 
unpaid labour as a dimension of precarity. 
The article supports Crouch’s assertion that core and peripheral workers ‘exist alongside and in 
tension with each other’ and the emergence of groups of ‘outsiders’ is a result of this interaction 
(2015:29). It is important to recall that the debate over dual labour markets has prevailed over 30 
years and Pollert (1988), in this journal, cautioned against an ahistorical analysis and any model that 
asserts that segmentation is a departure from a previously homogeneous internal market. Rather she 
emphasised sectoral restructuring and change alongside generalised attacks on working conditions 
characterised by work intensification and rationalisation. The growth in non-standard contracts has 
further shifted the balance of power in the employment relationship (Fudge, 2017). 
This article has responded to Smith’s (2006) call for further work on the balance between 
indeterminacies for different groups of workers and employers and how mobility power shapes the 
labour process under different forms of capitalism. In the context of dependent self-employment it 
suggests that Smith’s double indeterminacy is also double edged. The presence of owner drivers and 
home couriers undermines the mobility power of directly employed drivers, but also reconfigures the 
work effort bargain in favour of the employer. At the same time, while self-employment is apparently 
a manifestation of mobility, for owner-drivers the freedom of movement and control over the labour 
process that is implied by this contractual status is constrained. Despite the apparent contradictions 
of ‘double-double indeterminacy’, the reality of the dependence of self-employed drivers, as 
constructed through instituted economic processes, suggests resolution for capital.  
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Key informant trade 
union interviews  
 7    7 
Company A 
 
5  4 3  12 
Company B 
 
 3 2 3  8 





   5 1 6 
Additional interviews 
with home couriers 
    10 10 
Total  5 10 6 11 17 49 
Table One:  Interviews  
 
 
i The report records the work experiences of couriers working for Hermes. 
                                                          
